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Abstract 
Neoclassical theory says that  financial liberalization will make the cost of capital 
decrease,  productivity increase and output grow. In reality this does not happen. A key 
to understanding why it is so is the link between financial liberalization and income 
distribution. 
After financial liberalizations  both the real interest rate and the supply of  credit to the 
non traded goods sector rise. If   the monetary interest rate and  the profit rate tend to be 
equal in the long run, a reshuffling of  production favouring the non-traded goods sector 
will occur; for the mark-up may be higher in this sector than in the traded goods sector 
due to the lack of international competition. Households, no more credit constrained, 
will increase their demand for non traded goods; profits in this sector will increase too 
due to the higher capacity utilization. On the other hand the likely  fall in the propensity 
to save of capitalists will cause a slower capital accumulation.  Thus neither investment 
nor productivity will rise. This may not be due to the working of  real forces alone,  
such as trade liberalization, but rather to the interplay of  both monetary and real factors. 
A vicious circle of  lower growth  and  rising inequality could be set in motion. 
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Does financial liberalization affect the distribution of  income  between 
wages and profits ? 
 
Introduction 
Financial liberalization, according to conventional wisdom, would on one hand improve 
the growth prospect of an economy and on the other hand make the distribution of 
income more equal. All these effects however are hardly to be seen in practice. A wide 
empirical literature, grown rapidly in the last years, has shown that  in most cases 
financial liberalizations have not been successful.  Even if growth may have accelerated, 
though not in all cases, efficiency has decreased and income distribution has worsened, 
leading to an  increase in inequality. Higher output growth has not been accompanied by 
higher investment and by higher savings. In particular the realization of  financial 
reform has had a negative effect on the wage share in many countries. Real interest rates 
have risen almost everywhere.  
No consistent explanation, to  tie one to the other  these dispersed pieces of evidence, 
has been attempted so far. The authors of  the empirical studies usually make some 
conjecture on their own  results based on the standard  neoclassical model. Real interest 
rates would rise after liberalizations because higher rate of profits are earned or simply 
expected (see Reinhardt et al..2002). The higher prices of shares are also attributed to 
the expected higher productivity due to the liberalization policy (see Das and 
Mohapatra,2002). The data on investment and productivity actually do not support such 
an interpretation, as some students have pointed out (see the contributions in Taylor 
ed.2001). But this is not the main point.  The causal nexus in this type of  explanations 
goes from the  real to the monetary sector. This means that the high (either realized or 
expected) rate of return on capital would call for  a higher rate of interest.  In this paper 
instead  it will be argued that  the higher real rate of interest may be responsible for the 
higher rate of  profit. This means  putting together the different pieces of the puzzle and 
explaining why  high interest rates may call for higher profit rates but also a higher 
profit share  and  what are the implications for growth. Higher output growth but no 
higher investment may be explained in this framework. This exercise has been carried 
out   for  developed countries  by  Nardozzi (2002), who shows that in Europe and in the   2
U.S.  the higher real rates of interest  may have  led to higher  profit rates and, given the 
constancy of  the capital-output  ratio, to a higher profit share. In what follows I am 
going to argue that, unlike other types of explanation, this hypothesis might fit well both  
the stylized facts and the results of empirical studies.
1 
The first section reviews  the empirical evidence on the consequences of financial 
liberalization. The main results found in the empirical literature  are  the rise in real 
interest rates,  in the supply of credit to the non traded goods sector  and the fall in 
saving rate by both workers and capitalists. The third section  tries to explain the main 
results of the empirical literature by using the monetary theory of distribution. It will be 
discussed how the, previously mentioned, features of realized liberalizations will affect 
the distribution of income between wages and profits and the rate of growth. 
 
1 Stylized facts and empirical evidence. 
According to neoclassical theory, financial liberalization fosters the mobilization of 
savings and investment. Another more recent strand of literature, which follows the 
same approach, argues that a more efficient financial system will increase investment 
through a low cost of capital. In this section we are going to compare the predictions of 
the theory with the facts. To do this, we will see, by showing the results of the empirical 
literature, what happens to the financial deepening and  the cost of capital after financial 
reforms. Then we discuss whether saving and investment have increased. In the last 
paragraph the issue, rather unsettled up to now,  of  whether and how  the financial 
reform affects income distribution and inequality, will be dealt with. 
1.1 Financial deepening. 
A number of empirical studies have established that the increase in money and credit 
supply favours growth. These studies are cross-country studies which use data  of  many 
different countries and for long  time periods. As it is well known that  industrial 
development goes hand in hand with financial capital development, these findings are 
not  surprising . However,  that   liberalization increases the efficiency  and the size of 
the financial system is not always true. Though financial deepening has occurred in  
developing countries, which have liberalized in the ‘90s, one can wonder whether it 
really increased the efficiency of the whole financial system rather than that of a small 
part of  it.  Certainly, there has been an expansion of the supply of credit, but  the   3
quality and the conditions of  this credit were very poor for traditional bank credit has 
decreased in weight over the total credit supply. The institutions, which have 
contributed most to the increased supply of credit, were not efficient at all and the 
banks, having so many competitors, have suffered losses in profits and, to recover, have 
entered new and risky territories. The financial systems have not become more efficient   
and their   imbalances have often led to painful financial crises. The banking systems of 
some countries, which had successfully supported industrial development for decades,  
were terribly shaken  and broke down.   
During financial liberalizations  the structure of  the financial system has changed a lot. 
Thus, showing that banks’ efficiency increases  is not so relevant in an institutional 
context, in which the share of  banks as suppliers of credit has become lower. If the 
transmission mechanism goes from   increased bank efficiency to higher productivity 
then banks are the only financial institutions that matter. If, however, the efficiency of 
the whole system matters things are different. In reality banks face an increase in costs 
which is linked to the disintermediation process they suffer because of the competition 
by non bank financial institutions and by foreign banks, particularly on the side of 
deposits.  
The banks  also suffer because the economic environment has become riskier given that 
the probability of default of  borrowers has increased. The banks do not lend anymore to 
old customers but expand in  new areas such as  consumer and   foreign lending . Often 
both strategies  reveal themselves as not successful. The stylized facts are the following. 
The share of lending by non bank financial institutions, which  consists of securitized 
products  with a short maturity and high interest rates, increases. The expansion in the 
supply of credit gets along with the rise in the share of consumer credit over the total. 
While there may be a boom in lending, the amount of funds that  goes to enterprises, 
particularly small and medium ones, may actually shrink and  the conditions of  this 
lending tend to worsen. The boom in lending is often followed by a financial crisis  and 
by a restrictive monetary policy so that even the financial deepening argument does not 
hold in the long run. For example, in Mexico, after various financial crises,  now the 
ratio of money supply to output is one of the lowest in the world (see Bonturi 2002). 
Honohan (2001) also finds that in a sample of developing countries in the period 1980-  4
1998 inflation, financial deepening (calculated as the ratio of M2 to GDP) and output 
growth did not change significantly with respect to the preceding period. 
 
1.2 The behaviour of real interest rates after financial liberalizations. 
To prove the thesis that liberalization makes cheaper for firms to raise funds  on the 
market many have studied the behaviour of the return on equity; according to these 
studies, the equity premium would have decreased after liberalizations. Unfortunately, 
only a tiny portion of  developing countries firms can finance themselves on the stock 
exchange. Most of them depend  instead upon bank credit and own financing. The 
interest rates on loans tend to increase almost everywhere after liberalization have been 
realized.
2 Among the factors behind this fact are the increased mark-ups and the rise in 
money market interest rates. (see Honohan 2001). Honohan (2001)  has found out that 
wholesale  interest rates, such as inter-bank rates and treasury bill rates, have gone up 
after financial liberalizations in a  sample of developing countries and that their 
volatility has increased too. The time period considered is 1980-1998. The results of this 
work are that the spread between lending and deposit rates widens in response to an 
increase in money market rates and converges slowly to an equilibrium relationship. 
The equilibrium spread is in turn positively related to the level of general interest rates 
(both wholesale rates and deposit rates matter). Thus the increase in both deposit and 
lending rates  has the same cause in the long run: the increase in the wholesale rates. It 
must be added that the increase in the  volatility of  wholesale rates is not confined to 
the time period after liberalization but lasts forever. Official rates, at which the central 
banks lend to the commercial banks, increase too after liberalizations and, in contrast to 
the past, are higher than Treasury bill rates.
3 Even in high inflation countries, where real 
interest rates were zero or negative, real interest rates  have  risen, after liberalizations, 
to very high levels. Double-digit real rates have become the rule rather than the 
exception. The influence of international interest rates instead is not so strong. It is not 
clear from the description in the Appendix which are the retail rates used in the analysis; 
the only information available is that  they are no averages but  quoted rates for  large 
transactions. The  maturity of  these loans and deposits, to which the rates refer, is not  
given either. But, on the basis of  this information, one can guess that  average rates on 
loans might be higher rather than lower.   5
The reason why rates have risen has not been explained in a  consistent way until now. 
Honohan (2001) hints at varying conditions within the time period to which his 
estimates refer. He also speaks about increased loan risk. In Caprio, Honohan and 
Stiglitz (2001), there are some attempts at  solving the problem, which, however, refer 
only to particular cases. In Mexico for example the way the  banks were privatized 
matters.  They were bought  with money borrowed by the same banks and the new 
owners had to raise interest rates in order to repay their own loans (see Montes-Negret 
and Landa 2001). There may be a more general reason  for the rise in  average lending 
interest rates. It could be linked to the increase in inter-bank loans, which causes an 
increase in the layering of the financial system. An increase in the ratio of inter bank 
loans over total loans could be a suitable indicator for this. Most loans, before reaching 
the final borrower pass through the balance sheets of  many financial institutions. The 
higher is the number of passages, the higher will be the final cost of loans. The reason 
behind this is that many new financial institutions are neither allowed to take deposits 
nor, in some cases, to get refinancing from the central banks. They depend therefore on 
commercial banks and foreign banks  as to the supply of funds. Being these institutions 
known to be risky, they can collect funds only at high rates and with short maturity. In 
these circumstances  it is not strange at all that inter-bank interest rates have increased. 
The transactions in the inter-bank market were not considered as safe and risk-free as 
Honohan assumes. 
4 In some countries, certain non bank financial institutions were not 
eligible  at all for central bank refinancing at any rate.
5 
In most middle income countries where  financial liberalizations were implemented the  
supply of credit  went  mainly to the non traded goods sector; credit  to consumers is 
sometimes considered as credit to the non traded goods sector (see  Tornell and 
Westermann  2003). 
1.3  Saving and investment. 
That financial liberalization causes higher investment has not been proved so far by 
empirical studies. First there are a lot of doubts that the cost of capital has fallen after 
financial liberalization and, even in that case, that investment has increased. The only 
fact that emerges from almost all studies is that savings tend to decrease after financial 
reforms (see Bandiera et al.2000). Another study concludes: 
“With greater certainty, financial liberalization appears to deliver: higher real interest rates (possibly 
reflecting the allocation of capital toward more  productive, higher return projects.); lower investment, but   6
not lower growth (again, possibly owing to a shift to more productive uses of financial resources); a 
higher level of foreign direct investment; and high gross capital flows-- the catch is that occurs only in the 
higher income countries. Liberalization appears to deliver financial deepening, as measured by the credit 
and monetary aggregates--but, again, low income  countries do not appear to show clear signs of such a 
benefit. As regards saving, anything goes. In some regions saving increased following financial sector 
reforms;  but in the majority of cases saving declined following the reforms.” ( Reinhardt C. and 
Tokatlidis  2002) 
 
Two  doubts  can be read in the brackets of  the last sentence. The first one is on 
whether high real interest  rates  may reflect the allocation of capital towards higher 
return projects;  the second is on  whether the combination of lower investment but no 
lower growth  can be due to a shift to more productive uses of financial resources. 
These doubts may be are easily   solved by looking at  another study (see Taylor 
ed.(2001)). It appears that the most common sources of income growth in countries that 
have liberalized are consumption and state expenditure; moreover, in most countries the 
productive structure has shifted towards the production of  non traded goods,  which 
usually does not show  a higher return than that of  other  sectors.  
Summarizing the main results of the empirical literature are: a fall in the propensity to 
save; an increase in short term debt often in foreign currency and in securitization; an 
increase in interest rates, both money market rate and retail rates. It remains to be 
assessed whether and how the financial reform has affected income distribution and 
inequality, which is the theme of the next and last section. 
1.4 Income distribution and inequality. 
The evidence on this, which empirical studies provide up to now, is scant and 
contradictory. In the following I am going to summarize the main findings. A study by 
Clarke and others (2002) shows that there is a negative relationship between  an index 
of inequality and  some measures of  financial development. The time span and the 
country coverage of  this study are, however, very wide thus no inference can be made 
as to developing countries which have liberalized in the last twenty years. To the extent 
that financial liberalization increases financial deepening,  that result might  apply to 
this case too. Cornia and Kiiski (2001)  calculate that inequality has increased in many 
countries in the last twenty years, while reforms were being introduced. The data set 
they use is different from that used by Clarke,  which is the Deininger and Squire 
dataset. They measure the relation between an index of all reforms and an  index of   
inequality, so no conclusion about the relation between financial reform, as such, and 
inequality can be drawn. Behrman, Birdsal and Skezely (2001) show that  both financial   7
and capital account reforms increase the wage gap of workers with different education 
levels. The difference in the hourly real wages of workers with different levels of 
education is  chosen as a  measure of  wage inequality. The study refers in particular to 
the wage gap between workers with primary  and higher education  levels. Surprisingly, 
the index of trade reform does not explain at all the wage gap, while the indexes of 
capital account, financial and tax reforms  do  it.  The index of financial reform is 
composed of the  interest rates and the ratio of  reserves to deposits. The index of capital 
account reform reflects the decline in restrictions on foreign exchange holdings, 
portfolio and foreign direct investment. The index of tax reform measures  the decline in 
marginal income tax rates and the rise in indirect taxes. The index of trade reform is 
related to the decrease in tariffs for imported goods. The index of privatization measures 
the extent to which previously state owned firms were being privatized. The latter is the 
only index which tends to reduce rather than to increase the wage differential. Before 
interpreting this result, it is better to look at the rough data, since the graphs of the 
various indexes in time are available in the paper. The privatization index has no time 
trend, for its graph is almost a straight line, while the others are rising and,  in the time 
span 1989-1995,  their rise is steeper. 
Though the reforms appear to increase the wage gap and thus inequality,  they  were 
badly needed – so conclude the authors. It cannot be argued -- they write -- that all 
reforms are bad for equality, since the privatization increases it. Yet the privatization  
index does not show a rising trend. So it is difficult to agree with this conclusion. 
Another reason why reform policies should increase social welfare, according to them, 
is that they may  decrease  monopolistic rents and thus profits; but this positive effect 
cannot be ascertained in their study, which deals only with wages. This in turn would 
require an increase in the share of wages and a decrease in the share of  profits over the 
national income. Yet the authors themselves find that the same indexes, capital account 
and  financial,  cause a decline in the wage share and an increase in the profit share.
6 
Another reason why these results should not worry -- write  the authors -- is that they  
last  only after five years  from the introduction of  the reforms. This is not so obvious at 
all, since once that  wage inequality has increased, it remains at a higher level than 
before, even if it stops increasing further. In this case we mean by inequality the   8
standard deviation of   wages. 
7  The Gini index of general income might behave 
differently if  the different sources of income would show an opposite trend. 
Whether and how financial liberalization changes the distribution of income between 
quintile shares is the object of a work by Das and Mohapatra (2000). They show that 
after stock market liberalization the income of  the highest quintile increases and 
correspondingly decreases the income of the middle quintiles, the second third and 
fourth, in a set of developing countries. The lowest quintile share of income instead 
remains constant. This effect lasts however only in the two years after the liberalization. 
The reason why this happens, according to the authors, may be that the ownership of 
shares is concentrated in the first quintile. The dataset  is mixed for it  has observations 
both from the Deininger and Squire data-set and the WIID data-set. They have also 
calculated Gini coefficients of  income inequality in the years around stock market 
liberalizations and have found that they generally have increased, though not in all 
countries and to varying extents. The countries considered are India, Brazil, Mexico, 
South Korea, Malaysia, Thailand, Turkey, Pakistan, Philippines, Sri Lanka, Nigeria. 
Country studies on developing countries that have liberalized show a tendency for the 
labour share to fall   with respect to the profit share. In these contributions, however, the 
focus is on the effects of the trade liberalization on the labour market (see Taylor ed., 
2001). 
Diwan (2000)  shows that the wage share has declined in the period 1980-1995 in a 
sample of both developed and developing countries. He uses data on the “compensation 
of employees”  by the United Nations, which are pre-tax. He finds that  capital controls 
have a strong positive impact on the wage share in the North while having a small 
negative impact in the South. He uses an index of capital account restrictions calculated 
by the IMF, whose trend is  positive in the South but negative in the North in the period 
considered. This means that capital account restrictions were increasing in the South 
while decreasing in the North in the period considered. In the whole sample the effect of 
relaxing capital controls on the wage share is negative. Trade openness has a small 
positive impact, less than one percentage point,  on the wage share. What affects more 
the wage share in developing countries are financial crises, which make it decrease in a 
persistent way.  The re-introduction of capital controls during financial crises   mitigates 
the fall in the wage share.   9
To summarize, the effect detected by Behrman et. al. should lead to an increase in 
inequality as measured by either the variance of wages or a Gini index of labour 
income. The effect of stock market liberalization instead should lead to an increase in 
the share of profit and interest over national income, while the effect on the Gini index 
of total incomes is uncertain. If both effects would work we should find both an 
increase in the variance of wages and  a decrease in the share of wage over the national 
income.  
If  we neglect for a while the peculiarities of each work, it is not clear at all within 
which theory the results obtained could be made meaningful. Clarke (2002)  clearly 
draws on the  financial deepening argument; while the other contributions, though 
interesting, are not so easy to understand from the perspective of  the theory.  Behrman 
et al. (2000) open an unexplored field of research for they  show that  financial factors 
have affected the labour market much more than real have done; then, the state of the art 
is that, while  the link between trade liberalization and wages has been extensively 
studied, not so much ink has been spilt on financial liberalization and wages. The same 
authors do not help a lot in bridging the gap between theory and reality. Some of their 
conclusions, if carefully discussed, are in contrast with what they have found out in 
their empirical work.    
 
2 What are the most important lessons that can be drawn from the empirical 
literature?  
Perhaps the most important fact stressed in the empirical literature is the rise in the  
interest rate. Which is the link between interest rate rise and distribution? The more 
direct one concerns the expansion of the share of output  which does not come from 
labour. Another link could go from higher interest rates to prices. Higher interest rates 
could be passed on to consumers by mark-up increase. Thus, while the rise in the share 
of income from interest and  the fall in the propensity to save cause an increase in 
demand  and in imports,   the rise in interest rates and the worsening in the maturity of 
credit cut the incomes of  the middle classes and  of  the self-employed people, who 
cannot pass it on to anyone else. Since they account for a high  and rising share of 
labour in most countries the effect would be big. This is the reason why financial 
liberalization  may increase  the wages differential. The result that financial reform 
increases the wages differential has been obtained in a study using data from households   10
surveys, where informal sector wages and  self-employed people’s income were 
reported too. Firms in the formal sector are not hit  so much by the interest rate increase 
either because they have high profit margins and do not need to borrow to finance their 
activity or because they can pass the increase backward  to workers through lower 
wages. The conclusion may be drawn that  inequality   increases for two reasons;  the 
accumulation of  financial assets favours the richest and, within the labour share, those 
with lower remunerations are more hit. Those two sources of inequality show a different  
trend during the passage from boom to crisis and from that to post-crisis. While the rate 
at which  rich people accumulate financial assets may slow  down after the crisis, the 
monetary squeeze, which usually follows it,  lets  the incomes of  informal and self-
employed workers  fall down  further.  
Though a great deal of evidence on the effects of financial liberalizations  draws on 
wage differentials,   a rather smaller part of it deals with   the distribution of income 
between  wages on one hand and profit on the other. In what follows  I will try to 
explain why financial liberalization may change the ratio of  wages to profits. The share 
of interest  of course is an important distributive variable too but the inclusion in this 
reasoning would  presume an explanation of  why liberalizations may increase public 
and private debt, which goes beyond the scope of this note. 
 
 
3 How does financial liberalization affect the distribution of income  between 
wages and profit ? 
In this section we are going to explain some stylized facts of  financial liberalization  by 
using the tools of the monetary theory of distribution. In paragraph 4.1 we see why the 
rise in interest rates, which has been common to all liberalization experiments and has 
lasted after them,  might have led to a fall in real wages. In the next paragraphs  the 
decrease in savings and the increase in weight of  the non traded goods sector with 
respect to the traded goods sector are taken into consideration and  their effects  both on 
the rate of profit and on the rate of growth of  the economy are discussed.  
 
3.1 On the relation between interest and wages. 
A common feature of almost all liberalizations is an increase in nominal and sometimes 
also real interest rates;  at the same time the wage share appears to fall with respect to   11
the profit share. In order to assess whether there may be a reason why both facts happen, 
we recall what theory says on the link between interest and wages.  
One can assume that, given the rate of interest and the wage rate, the rate of profit is 
determined as a residual. If the interest rate increases and the real wage rate is fixed,  
then the rate of profit would decrease. Otherwise  it can be assumed that the mark-up, 
exogenous,  determines the real wage. An increase in the rate of interest with an 
unchanged rate of  profit  would imply a rise in the mark-up and a fall in the wage rate. 
In this case the interests of  bankers and  workers would be contrasting (see Lunghini 
(2002)).
8  
Ultimately the effects of financial liberalization on the rate of profit  depend on the fact 
that entrepreneurs raise  the mark-up by imposing a higher price for their products. This 
in turn depends on the competitive structure of the markets in which they operate. A 
persistent change in the rate of interest would cause a change in the same direction of 
the price level in relation to nominal wages, thus changing in the same direction too the 
rate of profit and in the opposite one the real wage. (see Pivetti (2002)) A reappraisal of 
this thesis can be found in Nardozzi (2002). Nardozzi (2002) argues that the high real 
rates of interest  have caused a rise in the profit rates, and, given the constancy of the 
capital-output ratio, even in the profit share. He shows through an econometric test that 
that a positive relation exists between the rate of return on capital  and long term real 
interest rates; a negative relation would instead link the rate of return on capital and  real 
wage per worker. The sample consists of developed countries, including  the United 
States  and European countries. Yet it is not clear the process through which these 
relations are generated in this particular episode. Ciocca (2002)  refers to the works of  
Sraffa. In Sraffa’s view   the equalization of  profit rates as well as that of the profit rate 
and of the money rate of interest comes out from  the competition among production 
sectors. Nardozzi (2002) does not work out in detail the circumstances favouring this 
process in developed countries. In developing countries this  link may be  easier to 
understand. The higher rate of interest, if it is believed to last in the future, will tend to 
raise the rate of profit. Since traded goods sector or more precisely sectors that produce 
importable goods  are more subject to foreign competition they will be presumably 
abandoned to  move to the, now more profitable, non traded goods sectors.
9 The   12
equalization of the interest rate and of the profit rate will require a reshuffling of the 
production structure. 
In the sector of  traded goods, being the competition from foreign producers higher than 
in the non traded goods sector, prices  cannot be raised. In the non traded goods sector,  
instead, this can and is often done. Another solution  would be a change in regulation 
that allows to lower the nominal wage rate.
10 Lowering nominal wages, even if   
possible, would not be so easy for entrepreneurs in the traded goods sector. For, if 
capital  and  skilled work are complementary,  the  option of hiring low skilled and low 
paid workers would not work.  
 
3.2 Wages and profits. 
We have mentioned changes in the distribution of income between wages and profits 
caused by changes in the mark-up. Now we try to see what means real wages. In 
particular  the real wage for each branch may be calculated by dividing the nominal 
wage for the price of  the branch product  or  by dividing  it  by an index of cost of  
living.   
If  the ratio of traded to non traded goods prices  decreases for the denominator grows 
faster than the numerator, then  the real wage of the workers of   the non traded sector,  
calculated in terms of their own product, falls. The real wage, calculated as the nominal 
wage divided by the consumer price index,  might well increase or remain unchanged 
reflecting  opposite tendencies in the prices in the  index. If, following some technical 
innovation, the prices of the traded goods sector fall, then the real wage rate of the 
workers in that sector would  rise if divided by the sectoral price index. Of course, the 
same would not be true of the real wage calculated as the nominal wage divided for the  
cost of living price index since the price of non traded goods does not fall with respect 
to the traded goods  but instead tends to rise.
 11 
This does not take into account the productive linkages among different sectors  in 
production. A  reason for this is  that  those linkages tend to be weakened by trade 
liberalization since most intermediate products are imported rather than bought from 
other domestic producers. 
If  the workers with lower incomes tend to consume more non traded goods, mainly 
food and  housing, then  their  real wage in terms of the consumption basket they   13
demand falls. Likewise  if  the workers with higher incomes tend to consume more 
traded goods and imported goods, then their real wage may rise since their own 
products have fallen in price and the price of importables may have fallen too because 
of trade liberalization. In this reasoning we leave aside exchange rate considerations. As 
a matter of fact in many countries  the exchange rate has been pegged to a foreign 
strong currency  at a level which  is usually quite high. As a consequence of this, the 
price of imported goods in domestic currency falls and thus so the purchasing power of 
those who consume them. If  high wage workers and  capitalists are those who consume 
more traded and imported goods then they would be favoured for the ratio of traded  to 
non-traded goods prices usually falls. Economists usually neglects the way economic 
liberalization through  relative price changes affects  factor shares concentrating instead 
on real wage inequalities. In the latter case the nominal wages are made real by dividing 
for the same consumer price index  (for a criticism of  this  way of proceeding  see 
Williamson (2002). 
If  the flow of resources through sectors is very rapid then  the whole economy will 
experience a fall in the  wage share and a rise in the profit share. If  different sectors 
with different pricing  and wage policies  survive, the ratio of the wage share to the 
profit share for the whole economy may be constant, rise or fall according to what 
happens to the wage/profit share ratios of  each sector.  A case in point  is Mexico. In 
this country the aggregate wage share was constant,   due to the combination of  a 
falling wage share in the non traded goods sector and  a rising wage share in the traded 































































1. Operating surplus (excluding oil, agriculture, commerce and other services) less property income 
abroad plus interest on public debt. 
Source : Ros and Lustig (2001) p.222. 
 
 If   the traded goods sector capitalists would instead   adopt a strategy of competing 
with low wages rather than technology improvements the wage share would decrease in 
both sectors and then in the aggregate too. Low wage workers in the traded goods sector 
would not  enjoy the benefits of the  constant prices of  their own goods if, as we have 
supposed, they consume mainly non traded  goods.  
3.3 Definition of  the  share of  profits 
Ultimately the increase in the nominal rate of interest would increase the rate of profit 
through its effect on the mark-up, which increases the profit share  while decreasing the 
wage share. The rate of profit  depends on the profit share, on the ratio capital to output 
(fixed) and on capacity utilization.  
The rate of of profit depends on the profit share over national income, capacity 
utilization, the ratio of capital to output assumed as a constant.  
  
P share of profits 
U  capacity utilization, 
K capital-output ratio 
 r  rate of profit 
(1)     r  =  uPk  
 
The  share of  profits in turn is the complement to 1 of the share of wages. 
If  competition  works,  in the long run a persistent high nominal interest rate would  
make the traded goods sector disappear.  This in turn would cause a change in industrial 
specialization towards the sectors where productivity is lower.   15
In the long run the rate of growth of the economy could  decrease, if the rate of profit 
which depends on technology exogenously given, decreases because of the lower labour 
productivity and if the rate of saving by capitalists decreases. In this context an increase 
in the  share of profits could be compatible with the fall in the propensity to save of 
capitalists if  they are supposed to consume, or simply to take out of the circuit of 
capital accumulation, a bigger part of their income. This would mean, however, 
violating the classical assumption that  capitalists save and invest  out of profits while 
workers consume only. In the end  it will win a model of specialization, which reduces 
innovation and technology to a minimum, while real wages fall.  
This picture fits well the trend in productivity registered in many countries that have 
liberalized. Taylor and Berg (2001) argue that in general only modest aggregate 
productivity increases were observed  in a sample of countries that have liberalized. The 
higher productivity growth was observed in the traded goods sector. The aggregate 
productivity growth has been measured as the sum of productivity changes by sector, 
weighted by sectoral  output shares, plus a  positive reallocation effect if labour would 
move from low to high productivity sectors. The country studies in Taylor ed. (2001) 
show that  within sector productivity shifts and output growth were decisive for 
aggregate results. In some countries  the sectoral employment reallocation effect was 
negative, which means that  workers were moving from high to low productivity 
sectors.
 12  A worsening in the productivity could then be due both to a higher weight of 
the non-traded sector in the industrial structure, reflecting a tendency towards de-
industrialization, and to the reallocation of   labour from the more to the less productive 
sectors. 
 
3.3 The effects   of   a     higher capacity utilization on the rate of profit. 
As a matter of fact, in many countries where financial liberalizations have been 
implemented, the saving rate  has decreased. The saving rate of  low wage workers, who 
are usually supposed to consume most of  their incomes, may decrease only if  they 
spend more they earn thanks to credit , whereas the biggest part of the decrease in 
saving should be imputed to the  capitalists. While, in principle, this could contribute to 
a higher domestic demand,  in practice it increases the demand for imports and the 
current account deficit.    16
If a decrease in the saving propensity of workers occurs, due to the introduction of   
financial innovation or other causes,  this effect in the short run could increase the rate 
of profit thanks to the higher capacity utilization. 
In the classical theory of distribution workers are assumed to consume only and     
capitalists to save only. Thus an increase in consumption may happen either if workers 
start consuming beyond the amount allowed them by their wages by borrowing or if 
capitalists are allowed to consume part of  their profits instead of investing them. 
During a liberalization process it could be imagined that workers may consume more by 
borrowing. Since most workers have a higher propensity to consume non-traded goods 
the decrease in their saving means a higher demand for these goods, and if the 
productive capacity in this sector were less than full utilized, an increase in capacity 
utilization and profit. The net profit  share will increase , the gross profit share not to the 
same extent   since  the amortization costs must be reckoned. 
Both the  net  effective rate of profit and the net effective profit share will increase 
thanks to the increase in capacity utilization. The gross effective profit rate will increase 
too, but the gross effective profit share will not do so because of the increase in the 
capital output ratio, which diverges from its fixed normal level (see Pivetti 2002, 
Appendix). In the non traded goods sector being the capital output ratio  not very high,  
this increase could be negligible. 
 
3.4 The effects of   a  lower propensity to save  on the growth rate of the capital stock. 
We have seen that, for various reasons, the saving rate has in fact decreased after 
financial liberalizations. Though this may have a positive effect on the rate of profit in 
the short run through the effect of a higher capacity utilization on the net profit rate and  
on the net profit share,  it may have a negative effect on the growth rate of the economy 
in the long run. 
If we write the rate of growth of the economy as: 
     
  (2)    G = s P K 
 
Where s is the propensity to save of capitalists, P is the share of profits and k is the ratio 
capital output, supposed constant.    17
In these models capitalists are assumed to save only while workers do consume. If 
capitalists start consuming more and perhaps on imported goods, the value of the 
parameter s, the propensity to save, declines.
13  
In reality what happens is that  workers consume more than they earn thanks to the 
relaxation of credit constraints and thus sustain the firms’ profits in the short run, thanks 
to a better capacity utilization. This growth is however based on a rising debt to output 
ratio and on external capital flows. Since the interest on debt  tends to rise with the 
amount of debt to output whereas the rate of growth tends to decline, due to the above 
mentioned circumstances, the country will rapidly be insolvent  and a financial crisis 
will occur.    
The missing piece in this puzzle is the informal sector and the self-employed people. In 
their case the mix of policies above described causes a drastic fall in  income due to the 
interest rise, the shortening in the maturity of credit and the increase in rationing. Since 
the number of self-employed people in developing countries is very high, their weight 
in the labour market is high too. This could, for certain aspects, be considered as a 
decline in nominal wages. 
 
Conclusions 
Standard theory says that  financial liberalization will make the cost of capital decrease,  
productivity increase and output grow. Rents, defined as difference between prices and 
marginal costs, would fall and   efficiency would increase. The stylized facts of  realized 
liberalizations  do not  fit  well at all with this picture. More than this, almost all 
empirical studies have found that no decrease in  capital cost  and no higher investment 
and productivity have in fact occurred. In most cases the inequality of  wage 
distribution, as various types of indexes show, has increased too. The empirical 
literature shows that some measures of financial reform have increased the wage 
differential among  less and more educated workers and  sometimes have affected 
negatively the wage with respect to the profit share. But these studies do not explain   
their own results.  I  tried to find an answer to the question whether and how the 
financial liberalization has decreased the wage share. To do this I  have used the 
monetary theory of distribution. In particular,  if we assume that in the long run the rate 
of profit and the rate of interest must be equal, a persistent rise in the rate of interest   18
would induce a change in the industrial specialization towards the production of non 
traded goods, whose prices can be raised without fearing a fall in the demand for them.   
After financial liberalizations both the real interest rate and the supply of  credit to the 
non traded goods sector rise. The equalization of  the interest rate and of the profit rate 
will make the mark-up increase in the non traded goods sector and  thus will worsen the 
distribution of income for the wage share shrinks. If  either competition forces are not 
so strong or  incentives are offered to the exportable sector, then a different pattern of 
the wage share and of the profit share in the two sectors will emerge. So far we have 
considered only one sector  worlds; we have supposed that no productive interactions  
between   sectors occurs. This is a very strong assumption; a reason for it is that under 
both trade and financial liberalization the productive linkages between sectors decline. 
If  high and low income  receivers are assumed to consume different products, then the 
picture worsens since those having higher incomes will be more favoured by the 
observed fall  the ratio of traded to non traded goods prices. This however can  hardly 
be observed by comparing wages in real terms using the   same consumer price index as 
deflator. The increase in credit will induce people to spend more, the reduction in wages 
notwithstanding.  This in turn will increase the  capacity utilization in the non traded 
goods sector and thus the profit rate in that sector. It may happen that  the propensity to 
save of  capitalists declines or that the composition of output changes containing a 
higher share of  rent incomes, the propensity to save out of which is lower than that out 
of profits. In both cases then the rate of capital accumulation will decline too. Thus no 
increase in investment and productivity would occur.  This may not simply be due to the 
working of  real forces, as those,  who reject the argument that trade liberalization 
means higher productivity and growth argue, but rather to the interplay of  both 
monetary and real factors. This may give rise to a vicious circle of  lower growth,  
worsening income distribution  and  rising inequality. By inequality  here it is  meant 
that  the share of wages falls with respect to the share of  profits rather than the increase 
in the wage differential. 
 
Notes 
                                                 
1 I am not going to test statistically such a thesis for developing countries. This task would require  an 
enormous work of collection and selection of  internationally comparable data, which goes beyond the 
scope of  this note.    19
                                                                                                                                               
2 According to Arestis et al. (2003), the relation between the number of  financial institutions on one hand 
and the deposit and lending rates spread  on the other is positive in some episodes of  financial 
liberalization.  
3 They are not included, however, in the set of  the  independent variables in the equations, in which  the 
spread between lending and deposit rates is the dependent variable. 
4 Honohan states: “Assuming that  quoted inter-bank money market rates relate to lending that is highly 
liquid and virtually free of  credit risk, Treasury bill rates at the same maturity  should be very close to 
money market rates.” p.69 . 
5 This is the case of merchant banks in South Korea. 
6 The authors state this in a footnote: “To address the question of  whether reforms have affected the share 
of wages as compared to profits, we used IMF data on the wage share reported in the National Accounts, 
by country and year, to estimate the effect of the reform indexes on the wage share (the ratio of wages to 
GDP) under a country fixed effects specification. Because we are not confident  in the quality and 
comparability of the wage share data and we are not able to control for time-varying country   
chacteristics, we do not wish to overstate the importance of these results, and so discuss them only in this 
footnote. The estimates suggest that the average reform index is associated with a reduction in the wage 
share with the index  lagged for one through five years; after five years the negative effect is no longer 
statistically significant. Among the  separate indexes it appears to be capital and financial sector reforms 
that are reducing the wage share.” (Behrman,Birdsal and Szekely  (2000), footnote 31, p.26) 
7 The Gini index of wages income should  rise proportionally to the standard variation in the case of a 
log-normal distribution  (see Bourgouignon 2003, p.8). 
8 As a matter of fact,  bankers and entrepreneurs might not be separate entities.  If  the market structure is 
such that a few oligopolistic business groups  prevail in the market  and the law  does not  explicitly 
prohibit it, those groups will rapidly expand into the financial sector. This has indeed happened  both in 
Turkey and in South Korea, where the share of  ownership of financial institutions by  non financial 
groups is very high. 
9 Of course the process may not be instantaneous; the adjustment may take a shorter or  longer time.  
10 The classical theory of distribution sees the wage rate fixed by  real factors and thus cannot  envisage 
such a solution. In reality minimum wages have been lowered by  a considerable amount in many 
developing countries. 
11 Such a mechanism seems at work  in Italy if the wages of the manufacturing sector are considered. 
They lose value since the ratio of  the price of  value added to the cost  of  living  falls  (see  Levrero  e 
Stirati 2004).  
12 See the data on the employment sectoral reallocation  effect for Argentina, India, Russia, Zimbabwe, 
Colombia in Taylor ed. (2001), pp.28-36. 
13 The hypothesis that capitalists  import more than workers  can be found  in Dutt and Ros (2003). For a 
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